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 Either corporate social responsibility (CSR) is paramount for the firms or not, 
is a matter of question since long. The present study analyzes this relationship 
in the context of moderating role of Institutional ownership (IO). Firm 
performance is measured through accounting and market value measures. 
Leverage, firm age, firm size, and log of sales revenue used as a control 
variables. Through applying panel data techniques, findings demonstrate 
insignificant positive association between CSR and firm performance. It shows 
that stakeholder could not assign value to firms spending as a CSR. This could 
be the reason that customers are not much aware about firms CSR activities 
hence, firms fail to capitalize their spending as an investment. Institutional 
Ownership (IO) reveals negative insignificant association with all profitability 
measures except Tobin’s Q where this relationship is significant. This 
significant negative relationship supports the agency theory and presence of 
strategic alliance hypotheses between influential institutional owners and 
internal management that leads to lower firm performance. The interaction 
variable of CSR and IO show positive but insignificant relationship with firm 
performance by all means.     
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, corporations are established as profit-generating entities following the free market philosophy. The 
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primary focus of these entities is on maximizing their shareholders’ wealth without considering a social perspective or 
the broader implications of the way they run the business (Jamali et al., 2008). As bigger corporations emerged in the 
wake of the Second Industrial Revolution1, they tended to have greater power and control over various global resources, 
and became increasingly subject to a regulatory framework of welfare legislation. This realized huge changes in the 
practices and structure of modern business and society (Jensen, 1993). These changes constituted a new social paradigm, 
which shifted the focus of organizations from merely achieving their economic goals towards understanding and 
espousing social goals as well in their business strategy. Moreover, the start of various social movements in the 1960s 
and 1970s such as the demand for civil rights, women’s rights, labor rights and environmentalism and consumerism 
further broadened the concept of the organizations’ responsibility towards their society and workers (Carroll & Shabana, 
2010; Visser, 2010). These movements made organizations realize that as change agents in a variety of organizational 
practices, they wielded greater power to shape various organizational, social and economic behaviors in society as a 
whole. They therefore needed to be more responsive towards social demands. In realizing their role as major change 
agents in the social and economic field, they also sought to be more responsive and responsible to their society and its 
demands (Hussain & Moriarty, 2016). As a result of these developments, the concept of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) emerged as a standout amongst the most key concerns for management, and has become the subject of an 
academic discussion throughout the last few decades (Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Karaosmanoglu et al., 2016). 
 
Finance theories witnesses that the only objective of the organization is to maximize the shareholder’s wealth (Arnold 
and Valentin, 2013). This objective explains that to satisfy the  shareholders is the prime objective of the organization 
but nowadays this is not the case as firms are not only affected by stockholders but the other stakeholders as well (Singh, 
2014). Stakeholders not only emphasis on financial performance (FP) but non-financial interests as well like social 
welfare, improvement in community and the environment (Pirsch et al., 2006). A UN Global-Accenture CEO study in 
2010 shows that 93 percent of 766 CEOs who take participate in this study considered CSR as “important” or “very 
important” for the continuity of the business for the longer period of time (UN, 2010). Firm’s response and behavior 
towards the relationship with society is depicts the sustainability of the firm in society. Sprinkle and Maines (2010) 
remarks that in the past firms emphasis only on sales growth, but this is not the case in now a days as firms have to 
focus on their other stakeholders as well to continue the business for a longer period of time. Stuebs and Sun (2015) 
narrates that this relationship is based on trust and this trust is developed by attending and exceeding responsibilities to 
society. 
Despite plenty of work on CSR by researchers (Browen, 1953; Donham, 1972), the CSR concept remained in 
deprivation from any unified supporting theory. There are two alternative explanations available in literature regarding 
the existence of CSR. First, based on agency theory, Barnea and Rubin (2010) claimed principal-agent relationship is 
the reason of mere existence of CSR engagements of firm and that managers are interested in overinvestment in CSR 
to gain private benefits by way of rising reputation as a formal civilian, at the expense of shareholders. This will extend 
their career opportunities and better negotiation power in the employee market. This overconfidence of managers 
sometimes makes value destroying investment. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) claimed that without active 
monitoring of managers, building an active empire of business is not possible. Second to appease all stakeholders are 
not possible.  
There is a stakeholder theory that focuses on conflict resolution among stakeholders (e.g. Jensen, 2002; Scherer et al., 
2006) by arguing that managers use effective monitoring / governance mechanisms along with CSR to resolve conflict 
among stakeholders. This spending will help firms to gain support and confidence of stakeholders by the way of creating 
reputation, customer satisfaction, and competitive advantage in the market (Walsh & Beatly, 2007; Salmons et al., 
2009). 
The emphasis on CSR and its disclosure increases by virtue of different corporate disasters regarding the community, 
environment, and human resources (Waller & Lenis, 2009). Now firms feel pressure from the customers end as well to 
focus on CSR to remain in the market. To build trust-worthy relationship and social capital is an important outcome of 
CSR and this social capital analyzed by different researchers in different dimensions like in connection with economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997), trust building (La porta et al., 1997a), financial development (Guiso et al., 2004).  
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“Is the investment in CSR increases firm's profitability” an unresolved question that has been attended by researchers 
for a long time. Fisman et al., (2005) studied CSR in connection with the accounting profit and concluded that in 
competitive industries, this relation worked more productively and efficiently. Goss and Roberts (2007) studied the 
phenomena in the context of bank loans and concluded that firms having worse CSR rating pay a higher cost of the loan 
than high rating CSR firms. Conversely, Barnea and Rubin (2010) argue that CSR activities are not value enhancing for 
the firms, they merely destroy valuable resources of the firm. The discussion on CSR-value relationship continues since 
long without a consensus on its direction regarding firm’s value.  
“How does CSR jointly with institutional ownership (IO) effects firm value” is the second question that present study 
intended to resolve. In this paper, through applying panel data techniques, we document that IO positively moderate the 
CSR-firm value relationship. In firms, the discretionary power to make spending in CSR activities remains in the hands 
of management. It has a significant impact on firm performance as suggested by over-investment hypothesis and conflict 
resolution hypothesis. Ownership structure is a productive governance mechanism to check this over-investment and 
conflict resolution behavior of the manager, as it depicts who has the ultimate decision-making power in an organization 
(Zattoni, 2011). IO is one of the major components of ownership structure of any firm. Institutional shareholders are to 
be considered an active monitoring device as per agency theory and institutional support theory. Active monitoring 
hypotheses posit that institutions have the right combination of resources, capabilities to actively monitor the firm and 
hence effective check on management and avert them from self-serving behavior (Sheifer & Vishny, 1986; McConnell 
& Servaes, 1990). So influential institutional investors help to counter this overinvestment in CSR through enhanced 
monitoring (Chen et al., 2007; Starks, 2009; Gillan et atl., 2010). On the other hand (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Guiso et 
al., 2015) claims that it can raise the conflict between shareholders and non-investing stakeholders, which overturn the 
CSR conflict-resolution hypothesis. 
This paper fulfills three objectives. First, it examines the CSR-firm performance relationship on a sample of 215 
Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) listed firms for the period 2010-2017. Secondly, we strengthen the CSR literature by 
showing that CSR value effect varies with institutional investment level. Lastly, present study provides valuable policy 
implications and recommendations for companies, regulators, academics, and other shareholders in the context of CSR-
IO value relationship. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 covers CSR practices in Pakistan; Theoretical approaches 
to CSR and financial performance explains in Section 3; Section 4 illustrate literature review on IO, CSR, and firm 
financial performance; Methodology covers in Section 5; Section 6 presents results and discussion, conclusion and 
future research perspective covers in Section 7.     
2. CSR in Pakistan 
CSR is mainly associated with the western world. These economies have predefined rules and regulations, mature 
capital markets, adoption of corporate governance (CG) mechanism, protection of shareholder’s rights which lacks in 
developing Asian economies (Chapple & Moon, 2005). Poor legislation, dominance of concentrated ownership, weak 
CG system is the main hindrance in adoption of CSR in Pakistan. Since in the last few years, CSR remained a widely 
discussed topic at different platforms but still looking much effort towards adoption of CSR in the practical world. In 
the corporate world, there are a few organizations like Pakistan State Oil, Shell, Unilever, and ICI- that act responsibly 
and disburse their earnings in society by way of CSR (Mian, 2010; Yunis et al., 2018). 
 
Responsibilities lie at both ends regarding the present scenario of CSR in Pakistan. At one end, the public is not fully 
aware of their rights and responsibilities because of lack of education and awareness. Second, due to deficiency in pre-
defined rules and regulation about CSR, corporations too not give priority in their strategic decisions. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) took the ownership and issued guidelines about companies regarding 
disclosure of information about ‘donations’ in their financial statements in compliance with the Companies Ordinance  
1984, part III, E-1 of Schedule 4. It further introduces Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance (WWF) 1971, which makes 
compulsion to firms to do participate in workers welfare schemes and presents the same in annual reports. Furthermore, 
there are different legislations made by regulatory authorities to promote CSR practices in Pakistan like inauguration of 
IAS 19 by ICAP, Pakistan Environment Protection Act by National Environment Quality Standard board, launching of 
ACCA-WWF Pakistan Environment Reporting Awards by Ministry of Environment, SECP’s general order 2009 which 
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is about disclosure of CSR activities by firms. Further, in 2013 SECP issued CSR Voluntary Guidelines to enhance 
accountability of the organizations. Now CSR is growing in the corporate world by accumulating efforts of government, 
regulatory bodies, companies and academic researchers. However, still there is a long journey to establish a CSR 
framework in organizations.  
3. The Theoretical Approaches of CSR and Firm Performance 
Predominantly, CSR-firm performance relationship can be well explained with the help of four theoretical approaches, 
namely, trade-off hypothesis, the supply and demand theory of the company, the social impact hypothesis, and the 
theory of modern corporate stakeholders (Salzmann et al., 2005; Laan et al., 2008).  
 
The trade-off hypothesis presented by Friedman (1970) claims that firm’s only social responsibility to enhance firm FP. 
Hence, the involvement in CSR activities brings additional expenses, which in turn decreases firm’s profitability. 
(Salzmann et al., 2005). So this theory places a company in a disadvantageous position who involved in CSR activities 
as compare to opponent firms. In this context, CSR has an inverse relationship with firm’s FP (Moore, 2001; Vance, 
1975). 
Supply and demand theory of the company presented by McWilliams and Siegel (2001), which narrates that demand 
for the involvement of a company in CSR activities maximize company’s profits. Stegar et al., (2007) noted that in an 
equilibrium condition, the level of CSR may vary; however, profit may be maximized or not changed. Hence, there is 
no relationship between CSR and firm’s FP. Earlier empirical studies like Mahoney and Roberts (2007); Patten (1990); 
Freedman and Jaggi (1988) support this theory and fails to link any association between CSR and FP.  
The social impact hypothesis presented by Cornell and Shapiro (1987) demonstrate that firm investment in CSR 
activities enhances firm’s FP. Thus the investment in CSR activities always in return provides greater reward to the firm 
(Steger et al., 2007). This positive relationship could be attributed as investment made in CSR could increase firm’s 
reputation, build strong binding with stakeholders and minimizes the risk of the company. The earlier studies of Simpson 
and Lohers (2002); Waddock and Graves (1997); Roberts (1992) has found a positive impact of CSR on FP of respective 
firms.  
The stakeholder theory too constructs the relationship between CSR and FP (Barnett, 2007; Jones, 1995) through 
keeping emphasis on stakeholders. Some stakeholders have explicit claims on company’s resources like shareholders, 
employees and the government while some have implicit claims e.g. the continuity of supplies, on-time delivery, work 
safety, gradually increase in the quality of a company’s product etc as demanded by the customers, suppliers, and 
employees etc. The price that must be paid by stakeholders for this claim depends on the company’s situation, including 
the financial policy applicable to the company. 
This section provides the theoretical linkages between CSR and firm performance. The theories presented in this section 
concur that there exist a mere relationship between CSR and FP. Like, trade-off theory witnesses the prevalence of 
CSR-firm value association but it is an indirect relationship. In addition, stakeholder theory is widely accepted in 
literature is more relevant to theorize the relationship between CSR and FP.   
4. Literature Review  
4.1. CSR and Firm Value 
Corporate social responsibility concept has been in academic debate since 1970s. Different authors have explored CSR 
in different dimensions. One of the oldest definition of CSR explained by Friedman (1970) as CSR is all about to 
conduct business as per shareholders desire, to make as much money but confronting the basic rules of society both 
expressed in law and those embodied in ethical custom. In economic development history, CSR is to be considered as 
a key ingredient to accomplish economic goals and wealth generations. Therefore, a number of studies tried to bridge a 
link between CSR and FP (Galbreath & Shum, 2012; Lin et al., 2009).   
 
Overinvestment hypothesis recommends negative relationship between CSR and FP (Cespa and Cestone, 2007; Barnea 
and Rubin, 2010). In organizations, there is an agency issue because resources are not in the hands of real investors but 
rather these are trusted to corporate managers who are suppose to work for the best interest of these resource providers 
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i.e. shareholders. Based on this agency issue, managers are interested to goes beyond the rational limit of CSR 
investment to build its reputation and enhance its image as a socially responsible manager at the cost of stockholders. 
In other words, it is to be considered as diversion of valuation organization’s resources due to conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders. Barnea and Rubin (2010) noted that managers have an incentive to move beyond the 
optimum level in term of expenditure in CSR. As such, this overinvestment in CSR can destroy firm value. They also 
found that higher insider’s shareholdings negatively associate with CSR activity. In the same way, Kruger (2015) found 
that there is substantial cost attached to social irresponsible behavior. 
Contrarily, conflict resolution hypothesis predicts that CSR investment enhances FP (Freeman, 1984; Makni et al., 
2009; Jo and Harjoto, 2011, 2012). According to this hypothesis, manager uses CSR as a weapon to minimize this unrest 
situation between shareholders and non-equity holders. Further, Jo and Harjoto (2011, 2012) argues that CSR activities 
are the better mechanism to communicate between insiders and outsiders, thus in this way mitigate the conflict of 
interest between the two and raised firm value. Guenster et al., (2010) and jiao (2010) found that corporate social 
performance is positively associated with firm value.  Cui et al., (2018) narrates that CSR activities help to minimize 
the information asymmetry issue between manager and non-investing stakeholders which in turn reduce the conflict of 
interest between them; hence raise firm value. 
Although, majority of existing studies suggested a positive association between CSR and FP. But literature also 
witnesses a number of studies that document otherwise. Brammer et al., (2006) suggest higher social performance leads 
to lower shareholder’s value. Nelling and Webb (2009) found no association between CSR and firm’s financial 
performance. Crisostomo et al., (2011) studies the non-financial Brazilian firms and found inverse relationship between 
CSR and Tobin’s Q. 
4.3. Institutional Shareholdings, CSR, and Firm Value 
Institutional ownership (IO) can impact on CSR-firm value relationship in two different ways. On the one hand, IO can 
positively interest with CSR-firm value association by minimizing the agency cost and overinvestment behavior of the 
manager through effective monitoring and efficient allocation of firm’s resources. IO is to be considered an active 
monitoring device that advocates the agency theory and institutional support theory. Researchers like (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Pound, 1988) support the active monitoring hypothesis by claiming that 
institutions have right combinations of resources, expertise, and capability to monitor firm’s management and prevent 
them from opting self-serving behavior. Mitra (2002) claims that IO is an effective mechanism to counter principal-
agency information asymmetry hence, increase the value of the firm. Significant relationship observed between IO and 
firm performance by the number of researchers like Al-Malkawi and Pillai (2018), Lee and Chen (2011), Gugler et al., 
2008. According to active monitoring hypotheses, it is expected that IO significantly supports CSR positively (conflict 
resolution hypothesis) rather than negatively (overinvestment hypothesis). Literature witnesses that presence of 
blockholders or institutional investors helps to mitigate overinvestment CSR by way of effective monitoring (Chen et 
al., 2007; Starks, 2009; Gillan et al., 2003). Contrarily, the presence of Institutional investors can exacerbate the conflict 
between equity holders and non-equity holders stakeholders (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Guiso et al., 2015), which 
resultantly overshadows the CSR conflict-resolution hypothesis. Thus, effective monitoring mechanism of an 
institutional investor can shield shareholders against value-destroying activities related to CSR engagement.  
 
On the other hand, IO can suppress this positive CSR-firm value relationship by raising the unrest situation between 
shareholders and non-equity stakeholders. Further, institutional investor can negatively impact on information 
disclosure, thereby raising information asymmetry between shareholders and non-equity stakeholders. High institutional 
shareholdings decrease management incentives and integrity (Burkart et al., 1997; Guiso et al., 2015), which in turn 
reduces firm’s productivity and firm value (Tobin’s Q). Moreover, institutional shareholders can extract own private 
benefits and not shared the same with minority shareholders and CSR-related stakeholders (Edmans, 2014).    
Recently, a very similar study made by Buchanan et al., (2018) in the context of U.S. in which they studied CSR-firm 
value relationship in the context of influential IO. They conclude that CSR-firm value association depends upon 
influential IO and economic conditions. By employing difference-in-difference method, they found that CSR oriented 
firm enjoys higher profit than the opponent before the 2008 crises but after these results are quite opposite that CSR 
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oriented firm experience more losses than the counterpart. So the direction of CSR-firm value association depends upon 
the dominance of either conflict-resolution hypotheses or overinvestment hypothesis.  
5. Methodology 
5.1 Data Collection and Sample Selection 
The present study aims to investigate the CSR-FP relationship with a moderating effect of IO on non-financial PSX 
listed firms for the year 2010 to 2017. The selection of non-financial sector is based upon two reasons i.e. it is the third 
largest sectors of the economy that contribute 13.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and provide 14% of the 
total employment. Second, financial firms skipped from the initial sample because of different tax and accounting rules 
and regulations. Moreover, financial firms are under strict scrutiny by the state-owned enterprises and restructuring of 
financial sector since 1990 resulted inconsistency and wobbly financial sector data (Shahab et al., 2018). As a result 
126 financial firms skipped from the initial sample. This brings down the sample to 473 non-financial firms. In addition 
205 non-financial firms skipped from sample due to non-availability of financial reports as well as merger, discontinuity 
in operation, and continued operating losses. Our final sample consists of 268 non-financial firms, representing 45% of 
total population of PSX listed firms during the study period. This study uses secondary data that gathered from different 
sources like annual reports of respective firms, SBP financial statement analysis data, brecorder.com, and from SECP 
website for the period from 2010 to 2017. The collected data organized in a panel for analysis. According to Baltagi et 
al., (2005), panel data is suitable for data analysis as it provides both time-series and cross section dimensions. 
 
After collecting the data of relevant variables, the initial data screening process depicts the presence of outliers which 
could create a disturbance in the generalization of the empirical results. To overcome this problem, we winsorized all 
continuous variable at 1% as this technique is helpful in order to control the influence of extreme values and outliers 
(Shahab et al., 2018).  
5.2 Measurement of Variables and Data Analysis 
 
The measurement and operationalization of studied variables shown in table below 
Table 1. Description of Variables Used in Study 
Variable Measurements Notation 
Dependent Variables 
Return on Assets Ratio of Net income to total assets ROA 
Return on Equity Ratio of Net income to average shareholder's equity ROE 
Tobin's Q Market value of equity/Book value of assets Tobin's Q 
Net profit margin Ratio of Net income to sales NPM 
Return on sales Ratio of EBIT to sales ROS 
Earning  Yield Ratio of EPS/MV per share EY 
Independent Variables 
Investment in CSR  Expenditures made in Donations, Charity etc ICSR 
Institutional Ownership Fraction of shares held by Institutions IO 
Control Variables 
Firm size Log of Total assets Fsize 
Firm Age Present year-Incorporation year Fage 
Leverage Debt/Total Assets Lev 
Log of Sales Revenue Log of Annual sales LSR 
2.   
The relevant variable data collected and arranged in a panel for analysis. To summarize and pattern of data, 
descriptive statistics used such as measures of central tendency, measures of dispersion. Further, STATA version 
11used for regression analysis.  
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5.3 Empirical Model Specification 
In this study, we investigate the impact of CSR on FP and secondly we evaluate the impact of IO on CSR-FP 
relationship. To furnish these objectives, we used two regression models i.e. equation 1 diagnoses the primary affect of 
CSR on FP while equation 2 shows the moderating effect of IO between CSR and FP relationship. Owning to data is 
panel in nature, panel fixed effects or panel random effects are the modeling techniques that used to observe the findings. 
The Hausman tests are conducted; the results support the use of the fixed-effects models as p-value <0.00 in all 
performance measures. 
FPit = β0 + β1ICSRit + β2IOit+β3FSizeit+β4Fageit+β5LVRGit+β6LSRit+ε ……………………… (1) 
FPit = β0+ β1ICSRit + β2IOit + β3 (ICSR*IO)it + β4FSizeit+ β5Fageit + β6LVRGit + β7LSR6it+ ε .. (2) 
Where 
FPit  =Firm performance measures through ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q, NPM, ROS, and EY for firm i for time t; 
ICSRit  = Investment in Corporate Social Responsibility for firm i for time t; 
IOit                        = Institutional ownership for firm i for time t; 
FSizeit  = company size as a control variable for firm i for time t; 
LVRGit  = Leverage ratio of sample firm for firm i for time t; 
FAgeit  = Firm age of sample firm for firm i for time t; 
LSRIT  = Log of sales revenue for firm i for time t; 
εit  = residual. 
6. Results and Discussion 
6.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of studied variables. Investment in CSR is measured through the expenditures 
made by the organization in donations and charity etc. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min  Max 
ROA 2136 0.059 0.1122 -0.2336 0.4353 
ROE 2136 0.138 0.375 -1.366 1.901 
Tobin's Q 2136 0.785 1.245 0.018 7.762 
NPM 2136 0.015 0.368 -2.713 0.960 
ROS 2136 0.078 0.291 -1.64 1.100 
EY  2136 -0.039 0.823 -4.322 2.165 
ICSR 2136 7.247 21.827 0 154.081 
IO 2136 11.714 11.319 0 53.000 
Fsize (Million PK 
Rupees) 
2136 19542.88 41691 22.195 395943.000 
LVRG 2136 0.274 0.228 0 0.997 
F Age 2136 35.625 17.654 6 102 
LSR 2136 9.556 0.802 6.888 11.245 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics of return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q, net profit margin (NPM), return on 
sales (ROS), earnings yield (EY), investment in corporate social responsibility (ICSR), institutional ownership (IO), firm size (Fsize), leverage 
(LVRG), firm age (Fage), and log of sales revenue (LSR). Sample period is from 2010-2017 and composed on 268 non-financial PSX listed firms. 
 
Result shows that, on average the ROA of sample data is 5.96 % with a minimum and maximum value of -23.36% and 
43.53% respectively. Mean value of ROE is 13.76% with a standard deviation of 0.375. The range of ROE is from -
136.65% to 190.06%. Tobin’s Q ranges from 0.018 to 7.762 with a mean value of 0.785. The average net profit margins 
of sample firms are 1.45% with a standard deviation of 0.368 and a minimum and maximum value of -271.3% and 96 
% respectively. Sample firms have on average 7.79% of Return on sales with a range from -164%% to 110% of sales. 
The average earning yield of data is -3.91% with a minimum value is -432.2% and maximum value is 216.50%. On 
average contributions in CSR of sample firms are 8.378 million with a minimum of 0 and maximum value of Rs. 
586.293 million. The range of IO is from 0 to 53% with a mean value (standard deviation) is 11.714 (11.320). The mean 
value of IO is quite close to standard deviation which show there is not much deviation regarding IO in sample data. 
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The average firm size 19542.88 million PKR with a minimum and maximum total assets are 22.195 million PKR and 
395943 million PKR respectively. On average, firms have 27.35 % leverage with standard deviation of 0.228. The 
minimum and maximum leverage among sample firms is 0% a d 99.7% of total assets respectively. Firm’s age on 
average is 35 years with a maximum age of sample firms are 102 years. 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix Results 
Variable ICSR IO ICSR* IO FS F Age Lev LSR 
ICSR 1       
IO -0.0155 1      
ICSR* IO 0.535*** 0.203*** 1     
Fsize 0.337*** 0.0573* 0.276*** 1    
Fage -0.0814*** -0.0246 -0.0270 0.00710 1   
LVRG -0.00974 0.0449 -0.0328 0.0380 -0.189*** 1  
LSR 0.262*** 0.0543* 0.228*** 0.488*** 0.0470 -0.0456 1 
Note: The correlation matrix is presented for investment in corporate social responsibility (ICSR), institutional ownership (IO), firm size (Fsize), 
leverage (LVRG), firm age (Fage), and log of sales revenue (LSR) for the year 2010 – 2017. 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation between independent and controlled variables. Following Andersen et al., (1990), any 
correlation coefficient value above 0.7 witnessed presence of multicollinearity among explanatory values. As result 
shows, there is not any value above 0.7, so there is no multicollinearity issue present in our model. 
6.2 Panel Model Regression Results 
To select which panel effects (fixed effect and random effect) model is appropriate for the analysis, a Hausman test is 
conducted with a null hypothesis that a random effect model is appropriate. The results of the Hausman test with all 
profitability measures are less than significance level i.e. 0.05. Hence fails to accept the null hypothesis that the random 
effect model is appropriate, rather fixed effect model is appropriate to observe the relationship between CSR and firm 
value. 
 
Table 4 shows the panel regression results with CSR and IO used as an independent variable and firm profitability 
measures i.e. ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q, NPM, ROS, and EY used as a dependent variable along with firm size, firm age, 
leverage, sales revenue as control variables. As per Hausman test results, fixed effect model panel data analysis 
conducted to empirically examine the impact of CSR and IO on firm’s profitability. Results reveal that investment in 
CSR has significant positive impact on profitability in term of ROA and Tobin’s Q while it remains insignificant with 
other profitability measures. 
Table 4: Fixed Effect Panel Regression Results (for primary effect) 
 ROA ROE Tobin’s Q NPM ROS EY 
 (FEM) (FEM) (FEM) (FEM) (FEM) (FEM) 
ICSR 0.0004*** 0.0004 0.0038** 0.0005 0.0007 0.0001 
 (2.69) (0.66) (2.38) (0.88) (0.17) (0.13) 
IO  0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0067* -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0021 
 (0.01) (-0.04) (-1.77) (-0.96) (0.02) (-0.66) 
Fsize -0.0196 0.1067** -0.0060** -0.0280 0.0093 -0.3825*** 
 (-1.58) (2.04) (0.005) (-0.63) (0.26) (-3.67) 
LVRG -0.1842*** -0.4278*** -0.9946*** -0.2523*** -0.1689*** -0.4782*** 
 (-11.59) (-6.23) (-5.90) (-4.39) (-3.64) (-3.54) 
Fage -0.0070*** -0.0303*** 0.1125*** -0.0120*** -0.0045* -0.0069*** 
 (-7.70) (-7.76) (0.000) (-3.66) (-1.72) (-0.91) 
LSR 0.0695*** 0.1917*** 0.1933** 0.2554*** -0.0154 0.3116*** 
 (7.64) (5.02) (2.04) (7.89) (-0.59) (4.11) 
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_cons -0.1149*** -1.5269*** -4.8148** -1.6413*** 0.3523*** 1.0759* 
 (-0.94) (-3.00) (-3.81) (-3.85) (1.02) (1.06) 
N 2136 2136 2136 2136 2136 2136 
adj. R2 0.1564 0.0740 0.1811 0.0612 0.0113 0.0299 
Note: We estimate fixed effect model as a panel data analysis technique for entire profitability measures as a dependent variables and investment in 
corporate social responsibility (ICSR) and institutional ownership (IO) used as an independent variables; while firm size (Fsize), leverage (LVRG), 
firm age (Fage), and log of sales revenue (LSR) used as a control variables. Sample period is from 2010-2017 and finally composed of 268 non-
financial PSX listed firms. 
The participation of CSR activities not only ensures higher accounting profit but also it enhances the reputation of the 
firm in the market which in turn may leads to higher Tobin’s Q. This positive relationship between CSR and profitability 
support the earlier findings including Kanwal (2013), Nadeem and Malik (2014), Mahoney and Roberts (2007), Wu 
and Shen (2013), Kang et al., (2010). IO shows insignificant negative association with profitability but in relation with 
Tobin’s Q, this relationship is significant. It shows that presence of IO in equity structure negatively perceived by the 
market participant as presence of IO can subdue the value enhancement of CSR by stimulating the conflict between 
shareholders and non-investing stakeholders. Hence assign lower market value. This negative association support the 
argument that presence of IO in PSX listed firms  brings an agency issue between influential IO and minority 
shareholders and further it support the strategic alliance hypothesis which is presented by pound (1988), that IO make 
a strategic alliance with insiders which is harmful other shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) too claims that in an 
organization shareholders having majority stake can expropriate the rights of minority shareholders which ultimately 
loss firm value. Moreover, Pound (1988) contended that IO build a strategic alliance with the management, which leads 
a negative relation between IO  and firm value as suggested by Craswell (1997), Navissi and Naikder (2006), Afza and 
Salahudin (2007), and Alipour and Amjadi (2011).   
Table 4 also presents the impact of control variables on profitability. Firm size shows significant positive association 
with entire measures of profitability. Large size firms have economies of scale and economies of scope benefits along 
with experience, technical expertise which in turn enhance firm’s profitability. Increased debt ratio not only increased 
burden on firm’s paying capacity but also a negative impression of firm into capital market which reduces market value. 
Firm’s age has shown a significant negative relationship with the firm's profitability. Sales revenue shows a significant 
positive relationship with the firm's profitability. 
Table 5: Regression Results (for Moderated effect of Institutional ownership) 
 ROA ROE Tobin’s Q NPM ROS EY 
 (FEM) (FEM) (FEM) (FEM) (FEM) (FEM) 
ICSR 0.0002 0.0001 0.0042** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.97) (0.17) (1.96) (0.36) (0.19) (0.02) 
IO -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0065* -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0021 
 (-0.36) (-0.15) (-1.65) (-1.03) (0.09) (-0.66) 
ICSR* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0084 0.0090 
IO (1.55) (0.49) (0.28) (0.45) (0.49) (0.12) 
Fsize -0.0195 0.1069** 0.0062 -0.0280 -0.0095 -0.3825*** 
 (-1.58) (2.04) (0.05) (-0.63) (0.27) (-3.67) 
LVRG -0.1844*** -0.4284*** -0.9961*** -0.2525*** -0.1692*** -0.4784*** 
 (-11.60) (-6.23) (-5.90) (-4.39) (-3.65) (-3.54) 
Fage -0.0071*** -0.0305*** 0.1127*** -0.0121*** -0.0047* -0.0070 
 (-7.78) (-7.78) (11.69) (-3.68) (-1.75) (-0.91) 
LSR 0.0694*** 0.1917*** 0.1935** 0.2554*** 0.0155*** 0.3116*** 
 (7.64) (5.01) (2.04) (7.89) (0.59) (4.10) 
_cons -0.1107 -1.5212*** -4.8246** -1.6372*** -0.3796 1.0792 
 (-0.90) (-2.98) (-3.82) (-3.84) (-1.02) (1.07) 
N 2136 2136 2136 2136 2136 2136 
adj. R2 0.1579 0.0742 0.1812 0.0614 0.0115 0.0299 
Note: We observe the moderating effect of institutional ownership in the context of CSR-FP relationship. For this purpose, we estimate fixed effect 
model as a panel data analysis technique for entire profitability measures as a dependent variables and investment in corporate social responsibility 
(ICSR), institutional ownership (IO), and an interaction variable of ICSR and I0 (ICSR*IO) used as an independent variables; while firm size (Fsize), 
leverage (LVRG), firm age (Fage), and log of sales revenue (LSR) used as a control variables. Sample period is from 2010-2017 and finally composed 
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of 268 non-financial PSX listed firms. 
Moderating effect of IO in CSR-firm performance relationship presented in Table 5. The interactive variable of CSR 
and IO shows positive but insignificant relationship with firm performance in all measures. Although the results are 
insignificant but positive sign support the conflict resolution hypothesis that increases in CSR-expenditures having 
majority institutional holding firms resolve the issues among stakeholders and hence positively linked with firm’s 
profitability by way of mitigating agency cost and overinvestment behavior of the management. Results support the 
findings of (Gillan et al., 2003; Starks, 2009) who corroborate positive impact of IO in CSR-firm value relationship.  
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
This study examines the role of expenditures of CSR on FP by observing the moderating role of IO on a sample of 268 
Pakistan stock exchange listed firms for the period 2010-2017. CSR is measured through the expenditure made by the 
organization in donations, charity etc. Firm’s profitability is captured through ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q, NPM, ROS, and 
EY. Panel data techniques are employed concludes the findings of the study. The prime focus of the study is to observe 
the role of IO in the context of CSR-FP relationship. Particularly present study seeking whether the presence of IO 
mitigates agency conflict and overinvestment behavior of the management or it subdue this positive relationship by 
raising agency conflict and information asymmetry between shareholders and stakeholders? 
 
The interaction between CSR-FP measures in first equation reveals that CSR has not impact on profitability in all 
measures except Tobin’s Q. CSR concept is not longevous in Pakistan and still a large chunk of firms are ignoring this 
area deliberately. This could be the reason that in Pakistan, CSR is in a state of deprivation because stakeholders do not 
pay heed to this issue. Hence this does not affect the profitability of the firm. These results are in line with the findings 
of McWilliams and Siegel (2001), Lin et al., (2009), Singh (2014). Further, IO shows insignificant association towards 
firm profitability except Tobin’s Q that has significant negative relationship. This negative association witnesses the 
agency issue and the strategic alliance hypotheses between large shareholders and the management at the expense of 
minority shareholders which ultimately destroy firm value. Moderating role of IO shows positive but insignificant 
association with firm’s profitability. This positive association supports the conflict resolution hypothesis that IO through 
effective monitoring mitigating overinvestment and agency problems; hence positively associate between CSR-firm 
value relationship. Leverage, firm age, firm size and sales revenue show significant association with profitability in 
both equations. The outcome of this study shows concrete findings for top level managers, policy makers, supervisors, 
investors and future researchers in restructuring the governance mechanism that suit best in the context of Pakistan. 
There is a need to promote the CSR culture in Pakistan and create awareness regarding its role towards the betterment 
of community in general and society as a whole. This will not only increase its adaptability but linked positively with 
profitability as well. Future research may be carried out in the perspective of family ownership and foreign ownership 
alike and discuss their effect in the connection between CSR-profitability relationships. 
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